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One apparent result of this program was a CIA-sponsored study entitled "Moslems of Soviet Central Asia" done by Richard Pipes, a well-known Harvard historian of Russia who eventually became responsible for Soviet affairs on Ronald Reagan's first and most ideologically committed National Security Council. Smith was described as the director of the CIA's "consultants' group. Lindbeck of Columbia, A. This incomplete but important evidence from the Mosely papers suggests that the Ford Foundation, in close consultation with the CIA, helped to shape postwar area studies and important collaborative research in modernization studies and comparative politics that were later mediated through well-known Social Science Research Council projects ones that were required reading when I was a graduate student in the late s.

The University of Washington in Seattle has one of the oldest area studies centers, with parts of it established well before World War II.

Grotelueschen on Winkler, 'Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I'

But the Cold War transformed it as well, beginning with a case that made headlines all over the country. In January the Board of Regents of the University of Washington fired three tenured professors for their political views: two because they initially denied and then later admitted membership in the Communist Party, and one -- Ralph Grundlach, a national figure in the discipline of psychology -- who was not a party member but was a radical who was uncooperative with university and state legislature inquiries. Ellen Schrecker, author of the definitive account of McCarthyism on the campus, wrote that this decision "had nationwide repercussions," not only as the first important academic freedom case in the Cold War period, but one that also established a model for purges at many universities thereafter.

President Raymond B.

Allen was the prime mover behind this influential case; Schrecker takes particular note of how careful Allen was to assure that proper academic procedure be followed in all political cases. There is no suggestion in Schrecker's account, however, or in the more detailed study of this case by Jane Sanders, 45 that Allen had extensive contact with J. Edgar Hoover and his close aides in the FBI as the case unfolded, or that he was advised by William Donovan on the crucial matter of how to construct a model argument against these professors, one consistent with contemporary doctrines of academic freedom that would stand up in a court of law.

I came across Donovan's role in shaping Allen's argument in the former's papers, 47 but the FBI's involvement was much greater. Allen had instructed UW faculty to assist in Canwell's investigation, and to speak with Everett Pomeroy, one of Canwell's chief investigators whom Allen wrongly believed to be a former FBI agent.

Niall Ferguson

In return, Allen said, Canwell had agreed to turn over the names of faculty to be hauled before his committee so that the UW could carry out its own internal investigation first and thus avoid public embarrassment. Allen was also interested in an arrangement that he thought obtained at the University of California at Los Angeles UCLA , whereby an on-campus FBI representative "cooperates with university officials"; he wished to have a similar arrangement at the University of Washington so that he could get current FBI information on UW faculty, and check the names of potential new faculty with the FBI.

Hoover scrawled on this document, "make sure this isn't being done" at UCLA, apparently a comment for the file since the FBI proceeded to set up for Allen what can only be called the arrangement Allen asked for -- the one he persistently thought existed at UCLA in spite of FBI denials -- one which provided him the information he wanted on UW faculty.

By November an FBI agent was seeing Allen weekly, and Allen in return was giving him privileged information on what the relevant faculty committee and the Board of Regents were likely to do about the suspect professors. Allen even provided the FBI with the entire transcript of the university's internal proceedings, including privileged testimony assumed to be strictly confidential.

In a case of particular interest to the Korean field at the University of Washington an area that it has specialized in since , Allen told the FBI that "although Harold Sunoo appeared to be an innocent dupe of the Party, he [Allen] was not entirely satisfied with the information available with respect to Sunoo," and asked for more from the FBI. Sunoo taught at the university in the early Cold War period, and subsequently was forced to resign.

Many years later he told me that he thought George Taylor, for decades the director of the Russian and Far Eastern Center at the university, had turned him in to the FBI as a security risk because of his membership in a small faculty group critical of the Syngman Rhee regime. I later verified that information independently with another Korean employed by the University of Washington at the same time. He had participated in the same group, and he said that Taylor's denunciation of him to the FBI was responsible for getting him fired from a department having to do with the arts and thus utterly unrelated to any possible security problem.

For nearly two decades thereafter he was unable to obtain a passport. Sunoo and other Korean-Americans whom I have spoken with from that era, some Koreans who were active politically in the United States were deported to South Korea where they were subsequently executed.

FBI files on these cases were closed when I sought access to them several years ago. An example is a conference he helped to organize in the same year that, in a celebrated case, the University of Washington canceled a speaking invitation to Robert Oppenheimer At first the conference was to be titled "World Communism and American Policy"; Taylor invited a local FBI agent to attend while assuring him that "there would be no improper interference from the presence of the agent," and offering to synopsize the conference for the FBI.

Subsequently the name of the conference was changed to "American Policy and Soviet Imperialism," with conference fliers using verbiage such as the following to invite the public to attend:. One only begins to understand the early Cold War period by learning that Taylor and his colleague Karl Wittfogel were also attacked as left-wingers or communist sympathizers by right-wing groups who noted Wittfogel's past communist affiliations and Taylor's presence alongside China-hand John Service in the Office of War Information and Taylor's membership in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

President Allen chose to stand by them, however, and shortly afterwards Allen accepted the directorship of the Psychological Strategy Board, a CIA position Taylor had turned down in Nikolai Poppe also taught for decades at the University of Washington. Originally a specialist on Mongolia, he defected from the USSR to the Nazis on the first day they arrived in his town in , and "actively collaborated" with the quisling government in the Karachai minority region in the Caucasus -- the first acts of which consisted of expropriating Jewish property, followed by a general roundup of Jews for gassing.

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He was picked up after the war first by British intelligence, and then by U. Poppe was brought to the United States in as part of the area studies program described above that was presided over by John Davies and George Kennan. There George Taylor introduced him to Benjamin Mandel -- the chief investigator for the House Un-American Activities Committee, and later for the subsequent McCarran inquisition of the China field; Mandel at the time was preparing a perjury indictment against Owen Lattimore.

None of this came out at the time of Poppe's testimony against Lattimore, and Lattimore's role in blocking a U.

Reparations for Slavery: The Role of Repentance in Politics

The annual meetings of the International Studies Association have an extraordinary range of panels, with political scientists predominating but with a profusion of disciplines and subfields typically represented on the program. It is anything and everything, perhaps with a bias toward international relations and policy-relevant research.

International studies is an umbrella under which just about everything gathers, from fine work and fine scholars to hack work and charlatans. In its early years in the s, the CIA underwrote this center almost as a subsidiary enterprise; CENIS grew out of "Project Troy," begun by the State Department in "to explore international information and communication patterns. Queried as to whether the center served just the CIA or a larger group of government departments, Millikan remarked that over the five years of the center's relationship with the CIA, "there has been some continuing ambiguity as to whether we were creatures of [the] CIA or whether [the] CIA was acting as an administrative office for other agencies.

The center provided an important go-between or holding area for the CIA, since "top notch social scientists" and "area experts" had no patience for extended periods of residence at CIA headquarters: "A center like ours provides a way of getting men in academic work to give them [sic] a close relationship with concrete problems faced by people in government.

This transcript predictably shows that the two big objects of such work were the Soviet Union and China, with various researchers associated with the center doing internal classified reports that subsequently became published books -- for example Rostow's Dynamics of Soviet Society. The primary impetus for this, of course, was the professorial desire to "get a book out of it.

We shouldn't take the risk on this. Perhaps there is enough detail above to convince independent observers that several major U. CIA-connected faculty were so influential in the s that they made critics who stood for academic principle look like wild-eyed radicals, if today critics merely appear to have been naifs who didn't know what was going on. If we now fast forward to the s we find that the first proponents of the state's need for area training and expertise thus to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era, and so on decided to put the intelligence function front and center, with a requirement that recipients of government fellowships consult with the national security agencies of the same government as a quid pro quo for their funding.

Several area associations went on record in opposition to this program, and it nearly fell beneath Newt Gingrich's budget-cutting ax in The NSEA was not completely "aboveboard," however, since its public board was supplemented by a "shadow board," and some complained that "aboveboard" was not quite descriptive of the Defense Intelligence College that was to house the NSEA. They thus hoped to find non-Pentagon housing and call the new office "The David L.

Boren Center for International Studies," but with no substantive changes otherwise. On 14 February three area associations not including the Association for Asian Studies wrote to Senator Boren expressing worries about "even indirect links to U.

The secretary-treasurer of the AAS, L. Peter Gosling, introduced the issue to the membership as follows: "The goal of our continued discussions about and with the NSEA [sic -- he refers to discussions with Martin Hurwitz] has been to make it as useful and acceptable to the scholarly community as possible, which in turn involves insulating it as much as possible from the Department of Defense where it is funded and located" [my emphasis].

Even though the NSE Board "sets the priorities for the program," this can be mitigated by "the use of re-grant organizations" in administering parts of the program, such as perhaps the Fulbright program; such modalities might enable an escape from Defense Department control.

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Gosling closed his statement by saying that the AAS has "made clear the desirability of distancing this program from Department of Defense design and control. At least three major area associations for the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa refused participation in this program, as we have seen. Anne Betteridge, an officer of the Middle East Studies Association, argued that "academic representatives do not wish to obscure the source of funding, but do wish to assure the integrity of academic processes.

A fair reading of these statements, it seems to me, suggests that Betteridge and the area associations from Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East raised important objections to the NSEA, whereas the secretary-treasurer of the Association for Asian Studies seemed concerned primarily with 1 getting the money, 2 showing AAS members how important the NSEA would be for Asian studies, and 3 evincing no concern whatever for the "traditional clandestine tradecraft" that makes "re-granting agencies" mere window dressing -- perhaps because of a different "tradition" in Asian studies: that of intelligence-agency support for Title VI funding, a tradition that I, for one, had never heard about.

These organizations have been the national joint administrative nexus of U.

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SSRC has not been a center of social science research as most social scientists would define it the Survey Research Center at Michigan, for example, would come much closer , but a point at which the existing disciplines find meeting ground with "area studies. As such, of course, it is a more important organization than any of the area associations.

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Heginbotham, appraised the NSEA. First, he welcomed it by saying that "new forms of federal support for higher education" have been "extremely difficult to mobilize" in the recent period of spending cuts, budget deficits, and the like. Senator Boren, he explained, wanted the NSEA to facilitate area studies education at the graduate and undergraduate levels, and had hoped the program would be part of an independent governmental foundation. However, the Office of Management and Budget blocked this, and instead ruled that for defense funds to be disbursed for the NSEA under the Intelligence Authorization Act it would have to be located in the Department of Defense.

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Heginbotham added in a footnote that Boren decided to further strengthen "the credibility of the program in academic circles" by putting the administration of the program under the Defense Intelligence College; "few observers were reassured by this provision," Heginbotham wrote, but the Defense Intelligence College retained what he called a "nominal" role in the program.

Heginbotham expressed particular concern about "merit review" provisions in the NSEA: "the academic and scholarly communities need firm assurance that selection processes will be free from political or bureaucratic interference beyond assuring compliance with terms of reference. It would not seem acceptable [my emphasis], for example, to have candidates screened on the basis of their political views. Heginbotham went on to recommend that grants to individuals be made by "independent panels of scholars," and that the academics on the "oversight board" be selected by a means "transparently independent" of the state agencies making up the same board.

He described the postgrant requirements for individuals as follows:.